Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1985

Phillip C. Pepper v. Zions First National Bank v.
Stewart A. Pepper : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Callister, Duncan and Nebeker; Attorneys for Respondent.
Biele, Haslam and Hatch; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Pepper v. Zions First National Bank, No. 198520807.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/609

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

W % &

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona
resident, et al,
Plaintiff,
vs,
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
et al,
Defendants and
Counterclaimants•

Case No, 20807

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
et al,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
STEWART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident, et al,
Third-Party Defendants.
APPEAL OF AN ORDER FROM THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE
********

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
********

BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Appellants
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Respondent
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 531-767 6

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona
resident, et al,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
et al,
Defendants and
Counterclaimants.

Case No. 20807

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
et al,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
STEWART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident, et al,
Third-Party Defendants.
APPEAL OF AN ORDER FROM THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE
********

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
********

BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Appellants
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Respondent
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 531-7 67 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, ETC

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

6

ARGUMENT

7
POINT I:
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PROBATE COURT ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER
ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST
ZIONS FOR FRAUD COMMITTED IN ITS CAPACITY AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THAT ESTATE

7

POINT II:
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
OCTOBER 8, 1981 ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER
ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST ZIONS
FOR BREACH OF ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS TRUSTEE
OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER INTER VIVOS TRUST

10

CONCLUSION

19

ADDENDUM

22

-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Cases
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)

14

Bullis v. DuPage Trust Co., 73 111. App. 3d 927, 391
N.E. 2d 227 (1979)

15, 18

Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal. 2d 366, 79 P.2d 1096
(1938)

18, 19

Estate of Beach v. Carter, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 542 P.2d
994, 125 Cal. Reptr. 570 (1975)
Hutchings v. Louisville, 276 S.W. 2d 461 (Ky. 1954)

11
9, 10

In re First National Bank, 37 Ohio St. 2d 60, 307
N.E. 2d 23 (1974)
International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515
(Utah 1979)

12

Liska v. First National Bank, 310 N.W. 2d 531
(Iowa App. 1981)

15, 18

15, 17

Matter of Estate of Winston, 99 111. App. 3d 278, 425
N.E. 2d 973 (1981) .

15, 17,

Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1978)

12

Matter of Irrevocable Intervivos Trust of R.R. Kemske, 305
N.W. 2d 755 (Minn. 1981)
11, 15,
Parker v . Rogerson, 33 A.D. 2d 2 8 4 , 307 N . Y . S . 2d 986
(1970)
10
Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873
(Utah 1983)

12, 14

Smith v. McMahon, 236 Or. 310, 388 P.2d 280 (1964)

9

Succession of Tolmas, 439 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 1983) ....18

-ii-

Sweeney v . Happy V a l l e y y
P.2d 126 (1966)

I n c . y 18 Utah 2d 1 1 3 , 417
8

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-1001(1) (1953)

7, 8

Treatises
Annotation, 116 A.L.R. 1290 (1938)

18

Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 2d ed. 1980

11

Restatement (2d) of Judgments §27

12, 19

2

10, 11

Scott on Trusts (3d ed. 1967)

-iii-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

WHETHER THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

PROBATE COURT ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST
ZIONS FOR FRAUD COMMITTED IN ITS CAPACITY AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THAT ESTATE.
2.

WHETHER THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

PROBATE COURT ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST
ZIONS FOR BREACH OF ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS TRUSTEE OF THE JEROME
B. PEPPER INTER VIVOS TRUST.
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, ETC.
Utah Code Ann. §7 5-3-1001.

Formal proceedings termin-

ating administration - Testate or Intestate - Order of general
protection.
(1)

A personal representative or any interested person

may petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate.
The personal representative may petition at any time, and any
other interested person may petition after one year from the
appointment of the original personal representative except that no
petition under this section may be entertained until the time for
presenting claims which arose prior to the death of the
decedent has expired.

The petition may request the court to

determine testacy, if not previously determined, to consider the
final account or compel or approve an accounting and distribution,
-1-

to construe any will or determine heirs, and to adjudicate the
final settlement and distribution of the estate.

After notice to

all interested persons and hearing the court may enter an order or
orders, on appropriate conditions, determining the persons
entitled to distribution of the estate, and, as circumstances
require, approving settlement and directing or approving
distribution of the estate and discharging the personal
representative from further claim or demand of any interested
person.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from an Order (R. 1347-52)
(see Exhibit "'A11 in Addendum) granting defendant-respondent, Zions
First National Bank's ("Zions") motion for partial summary
judgment.

This lawsuit arises from disputes over Zions handling

of fiduciary duties in connection with the Jerome B. Pepper
Estate.
The Third Judicial District Court heard argument in this
matter on May 6, 1985 and June 10, 1985 and entered the Order from
which appellants appeal on July 5, 1985.

The Order dismissed

plaintiffs1 first and second causes of action.

The Court made

that Order final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 15,1975, Jerome B. Pepper created an inter vivos
-2-

trust and appointed Zions trustee.

That trust was for the benefit

of Mr. Pepper's wife and children.

Mr. Pepper's will left most of

his assets to that trust.

His will also appointed Zions personal

representative of his estate.

Jerome B. Pepper died on January

18, 1976 (R. 176-177).
Zions did not close the Pepper estate until October 8,
1981.

On that date the probate court entered an order granting

Zions petition for approval of the only formal accounting Zions
ever prepared in connection with its stewardship of the Pepper
estate (R. 1313-26).

Plaintiffs did not appear at the hearing on

Zions petition for approval of the first and final accounting (R.
1322).

Zions filed that petition both as personal representative

of the Jerome B. Pepper estate and in its capacity as trustee of
the Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust.

In the latter capacity,

it only sought approval of a sales agreement it had entered into
as trustee and of its disposition of the proceeds from that sale.
The October 8 f 1981 order approved those acts but did not purport
to release the trustee from liability for any other acts or
omissions (R. 1324-25).
According to the allegations of plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint (R. 175-200), which the trial court had to
accept as true for purposes of ruling on defendant's partial
summary judgment motion, Zions valued the Pepper estate at
$2,404,839 in an application for credit on January 28, 1980 (R.
182).

Nonetheless, Zions' petition for approval of the first and
-3-

final accounting asserts that, on September 22, 1981, the estate
had only liabilities to pass on to the Jerome B. Pepper inter
vivos trust (R. 1314).

Plaintiffs have alleged that this

discrepancy arose because Zions dissipated the assets of the
Pepper estate during its tenure as personal representative through
negligence, fraud and self dealing. Plaintiffs1 original
complaint, which they filed on April 6, 1982 (R. 2-21), asserted a
number of claims against Zions as personal representative based on
those allegations.
On May 7, 1982, Zions moved to dismiss on the grounds
that the October 8, 1981 probate court order approving the first
and final accounting ("the October 8, 1981 order") (see Exhibit
"B" in Addendum) barred any subsequent claims against the personal
representative.

The court held that the October 8, 1981 order

barred all claims against the personal representative unless the
complaint alleged fraud.

It also found that plaintiffs1 complaint

did not allege fraud with sufficient particularity.

By an order

dated June 23, 1982 (R. 64-66), the court dismissed plaintiffs'
complaint with leave to amend so as to allege fraud adequately.
Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to allege properly that
Zions as personal representative had committed fraud. Their fraud
claims are asserted in the first cause of action of the Second
Amended Complaint (R. 185-88).
Plaintiffs have also asserted a claim against Zions in
its capacity as trustee.

That claim is stated in the second cause
-4-

of action of the Second Amended Complaint (R. 188-92).

It is

based on the trustee's failure to prevent entry of the October 8,
1981 order.

Plaintiffs maintain that the trustee had a duty to

preserve and pursue any claims against the personal representative
for dissipating the assets that Jerome B. Pepper's will earmarked
for the trust.

Objecting to the first and final accounting and

preventing discharge of the personal representative may have been
a prerequisite to pursuing some such claims. Plaintiffs assert
that Zions, having failed in its duty to prevent entry of the
October 8, 1981, order should be liable for the loss of any claims
against the personal representative that are barred as a result of
that order.
On April 15, 1985, Zions filed a motion for partial
summary judgment seeking dismissal of "any part of plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint which questions alleged actions or
omissions of Zions which were approved pursuant to the October 8,
1981 Order" (R. 1153).

Zions asserted that all such parts of

plaintiffs' complaint, including plaintiffs' claims for fraud
against the personal representative and plaintiffs' claim against
the trustee for failure to object to the first and final
accounting, were barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

By an

order dated July 5, 1985 (R. 1347-52), the court granted Zions
motion and dismissed plaintiffs' first and second causes of
action.

-5-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court's conclusion that the October 8, 1981
order barred claims for fraud against Zions as personal
representative and claims against Zions as trustee for failure to
object to entry of that order is erroneous.

Its July 5, 1985

order granting Zions1 motion for partial summary judgment should
therefore be reversed.
Several cases from other jurisdictions hold that claims
for fraud against a personal representative survive an order
discharging him.

No other conclusion is consistent with the

purpose of the Uniform Probate Code.

The legislature did not

conceive probate proceedings as a shelter for the fraudulent
behavior of a personal representative.
Even if plaintiffs1 fraud claims are barred, the October
8, 1981 order cannot bar a claim against the trustee for failure
to prevent entry of that order and preserve claims against the
personal representative.

The October 8, 1981 order does not

purport to decide whether the trustee breached its duty to
preserve and pursue claims against the personal representative.
Moreover, a claim for breaching that duty by failing to prevent
the entry of the October 8, 1981 order could not mature until
after that order was entered.

It could not therefore have been

adjudicated in the proceedings leading up to that order.

Since

plaintiffs1 claim against Zions as trustee neither was nor could
have been decided by the October 8, 1981 order, that order cannot
-6-

bar plaintiffs1 claim,
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE COORT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROBATE
COURT ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS
AGAINST ZIONS FOR FRAUD COMMITTED IN ITS CAPACITY
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THAT ESTATE
Claims against a personal representative for fraud are
outside the scope of matters determined in a proceeding to close
an estate.

Such claims cannot therefore be barred by an order

closing an estate and discharging the personal representative.
The holding of the court below that plaintiffs1 claims against
Zions for fraud are barred is erroneous and should be reversed.
Zions relies on Utah Code Ann. §75-3-1001(1) (1953) to
establish that the Uniform Probate Code permits a personal
representative to shield itself from liability for fraud by
obtaining an order settling the estate.

That section does provide

that such an order discharges "the personal representative from
further claim or demand of any interested person."

It should not,

however, be construed to offer a personal representative refuge
from any liability when it has betrayed its fiduciary responsibilities by committing fraud.
Section 75-3-1001(1) was designed to ease the distribution of estates by requiring all persons with claims against the
estate to present them for adjudication at a certain time.

It was

not designed to permit a personal representative to defraud the
-7-

estate with impunity.
If this Court adopts the interpretation of §75-3-1001(1)
that Zions has espoused it will place an unconscionable burden on
the beneficiaries of an estate.

The beneficiaries would have to

determine whether the personal representative has performed his
duties without absolute integrity before the court enters an order
closing the estate.

This would give rise to a contest of wits

between a dishonest personal representative and the beneficiaries
of the estate to whom he owes a fiduciary duty.

In that contest,

the personal representative has all the advantages.
the flow of information.

He controls

The beneficiaries may never have any

reason to suspect foul play.
Zions1 interpretation of §75-3-1001(1) would maximize the
beneficiaries1 risk of loss due to a personal representative's
fraud.

At the same time it would minimize a dishonest personal

representative's risk of liability.
have intended this result.

The legislature could not

The law should be construed to protect

the beneficiaries rather than a fiduciary who betrayed his trust.
See Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126,
129 (19 66) ("When a fiduciary deals for his own interest with the
beneficiary, in case any question arises, such dealings should be
scrutinized with great care, and the burden is upon him to show
good faith.") .
A number of courts from other jurisdictions have construed
the law to protect beneficiaries by holding that an order closing
-8-

an estate and discharging the personal representative does not bar
an action against the personal representative for fraud committed
in performing its fiduciary responsibilities.

Smith v. McMahon,

236 Or. 310f 388 P.2d 280 (1964)f is one case on point.
In Smithy the plaintiff filed suit to compel the executor
of the estate of Mrs. Josephine Ross to return property Mrs. Ross
had given him prior to her death. The court had approved the
executor's final accounting in connection with Mrs. Ross1 estate
before plaintiffs had commenced their action.

As in this case,

defendant urged that the order approving the accounting barred the
issues plaintiffs sought to litigate.
argument.

The court rejected that

It said that the order approving the final accounting

"was not determinative as to any of the issues presented in this
suit."

Smith, 388 P.2d at 282.
Hutchings v. Louisville, 276 S.W. 2d 461 (Ky. 1954), is

also relevant.

That case involved a judicially supervised trust.

In 1930, the court discharged the trustee and approved distribution of the trust corpus.

In 1944, plaintiffs sued to recover

damages from the trustee for self dealing and to obtain an
accounting.
action.

Defendant raised res judicata as a defense to that

The court rejected that defense, holding that the 1930

order was not conclusive as to fraudulent self dealing:
It was the duty of the defendant to disclose
all of the material facts that would put the
beneficiary on notice that a breach of trust
had been committed.... This they did not do
and consequently, plaintiffs are not

-9-

precluded from now asking the defendant to
account for its self dealing....
Id. at 465.

See also Parker v. Rogersony 33 A.D. 2d 284, 307

N.Y.S. 2d 968, 994 (1970)

("[S]ince [plaintiff]... alleges that

the facts in the prior proceeding were misrepresented, the decree
cannot be res judicata.11).
This Court should follow the approach these cases suggest
and hold that the October 8, 1981 Order does not bar plaintiffs'
claims for fraud.
Point II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
OCTOBER 8, 1981 ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER
ESTATE BARRED SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST ZIONS
FOR BREACH OF ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS TRUSTEE
OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER INTER VIVOS TRUST
Plaintiffs have alleged that Zions breached its fiduciary
duty as trustee of the Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust by
failing to make any objection to the personal representative's
first and final accounting, thus permitting entry of the October
8, 1981 order. It is widely recognized that such a breach of duty
is actionable:
A trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries
to take reasonable steps to realize on claims
which he holds in trust. If he fails to take
such steps as are reasonable, he is subject to
surcharge for such losses as result from his
failure to act.... He is subject to surcharge
if he does not take reasonable steps to enforce
a claim against predecessor trustees or against
the executors, to compel them to transfer
property to him or to redress a breach of trust
committed by them.
-10-

2 Scott on Trusts §177 at 4-1425 (3d ed. 1967).

See also Bogert,

Trusts and Trusteesy §583 (2d ed. 1980).
A trustee's duty to pursue claims against the personal
representative that preceded the trustee in control of the trust
assets does not change merely because the trustee and the personal
representative are the same entity.

In such a situation, the

trustee is liable if it fails to preserve and pursue a claim
against itself.

See, e.g., Matter of Irrevocable Intervivos Trust

of R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W. 2d 755, 762 (Minn. 1981)

("The fact that

a bank serves in a dual capacity, and as trustee may have to
question its own conduct as executor, does not alter the trustee's
duty to its beneficiaries."); Estate of Beach v. Carter, 15 Cal.
3d 623, 542 P.2d 994, 1003, 125 Cal. Reptr. 570 (1975) ("The
present bank's powers and duties as executor were just as distinct
from its powers and duties as trustee as if the will had named
another bank as trustee.").
The lower court's order of partial summary judgment
deprived plaintiffs of a hearing on the merits of their claim
against Zions as trustee.

That order concluded that plaintiffs1

claim against the trustee is barred under the doctrine of res
judicata as a result of the preclusive effect of the October 8,
1981 order.
A court should be reluctant to reach that conclusion in
this case. Mr. Pepper, knowing that after his death his wife and
family would need economic protection, hired a professional
-11-

trustee to guard his estate for their benefit.

Zions betrayed his

trust by choosing to enhance its profit and protect itself rather
than the Pepper family.

Is it equitable to shield a trustee from

liability in this situation?

Since nothing in the doctrine of res

judicata compels that result here the order dismissing plaintiffs1
second cause of action should be reversed.
Res judicata has two branches:
claim preclusion.
873 (Utah 1983).

Issue preclusion and

See Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d
Neither branch of res judicata should prevent

plaintiffs from presenting the merits of their claim against the
trustee.
Issue preclusion bars relitigation of an issue that was
"actually litigated and determined" in an earlier proceeding on a
different cause of action.
Judgments §27.

See Penrod, supra; Restatement (2d) of

No issue can be "actually litigated and deter-

mined" against a litigant for purposes of issue preclusion unless
the litigant appears and presents argument on that issue.

Thus,

for example, a litigant who defaulted in one proceeding cannot, as
a result, be subject to issue preclusion in a later proceeding.
Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d 789 (3rd Cir. 1978); International
Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979).

The Restatement

(2d) of Judgments §27, Comment (e), makes this point succinctly:
"A judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as to issues
which might have been but were not litigated and determined in the
prior action....

In the case of a judgment entered by confession,
-12-

consent, or default, none of the issues is actually litigated."
Plaintiffs did not appear in the proceeding that led to
the October 8, 1981 order.

The probate court's conclusions rested

exclusively on Zions' self-serving statements.

Since nothing was

contested before the probate court, nothing was "actually
litigated and determined" there.

For issue preclusion purposes,

the October 8, 1981 order was exactly analagous to a default
judgment.

Like a default judgment, that order cannot give rise to

any issue preclusion.
Zions has argued that the October 8, 1981 Order represents a judicial determination that Zions did nothing wrong as
personal representative of the Pepper estate.

According to Zions,

it follows that plaintiffs are barred from litigating their claim
against the trustee because that claim presupposes the personal
representative breached its fiduciary duties (R. 1304-05).
argument seems to rely on issue preclusion.

This

Since there can be no

issue preclusion as a result of the October 8, 1981 order, that
reliance is misplaced.
The concept of claim preclusion is equally useless as
support for the argument that res judicata bars plaintiffs claim
against the trustee.

Claim preclusion bars relitigation of claims

which are within the scope of a valid judgment in an earlier
action, even if the barred claim was not actually litigated in the
earlier action. A claim cannot be within the scope of an earlier
judgment and subject to claim preclusion unless that claim either
-13-

was or could have been determined in the proceeding that led to
the earlier judgment.

See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94

(1980); Penrod , supra at 875.
The October 8, 1981 order did not adjudicate plaintiffs1
claims against the trustee.

It only mentions the trustee to

approve one specified transaction.

Moreover, plaintiffs1 claim

against Zions as trustee could not have been determined at the
hearing on Zions petition for approval of the first and final
accounting.
Plaintiffs could not have asserted their claim against
the trustee in the proceeding that led to the October 8, 1981
order because their claim was not ripe until after that order was
entered.

Plaintiffs1 claim against the trustee is based on the

trustee1s failure to object to the first and final accounting.
That omission injured plaintiffs because it permitted entry of the
October 8, 1981 order which may bar some of plaintiffs1 claims
against the personal representative.

Plaintiffs suffered no

injury from the trustee's breach of duty until the court entered
the October 8, 1981 order.

Assertion of plaintiffs1 claim against

the trustee would have been premature before they suffered that
injury.

They could not, therefore, have asserted their claim

against the trustee in the proceedings that led to the October 8,
1981 order.

Since they could not have done so then, claim

preclusion cannot bar them from doing so now.
If this Court holds that the October 8, 1981 order bars
-14-

plaintiffs1 claim against the trustee, it will permit Zions
simultaneously to breach its fiduciary duties as trustee and to
shield itself from liability for that breach.

Such a result would

make Zions' responsibilities as trustee meaningless, since no
action to enforce those responsibilities would ever have been
possible.

Zions voluntarily undertook those responsibilities and

received payment for doing so.
failure to discharge them.

It should be liable for its

Res judicata cannot bar a claim for

injury at the very moment the injury occurs without violating
fundamental notions of fairness.
Although plaintiffs have found no Utah authority directly
on point, a number of appellate courts in other jurisdictions have
considered the narrow issue presented here:

Does the liability of

a trustee for failure to pursue a claim against itself as personal
representative survive an order discharging the personal representative?

As far as plaintiffs have been able to determine, every

appellate decision on that issue in the last forty-seven years has
determined that it does.

See Matter of Irrevocable Intervivos

Trust of R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W. 2d 755 (Minn. 1981)? In Re First
National Bank, 37 Ohio St. 2d 60, 307 N.E. 2d 23 (1974); Matter of
Estate of Winston, 99 111. App. 3d 278, 425 N.E. 2d 973 (111. App.
1981); Liska v. First National Bank, 310 N.W. 2d 531 (Iowa App.
1981); Bullis v. DuPage Trust Co., 73 111. App. 927, 391 N.E. 2d
227 (1979).
The defendant bank in Kemske was both executor of Rudolf
-15-

Kemske's estate and trustee of a trust which was the "primary
legatee" of Mr. Kemske's estate.

305 N.W. 2d at 761. The probate

court had approved a final decree of distribution more than two
years before the Kemske suit was filed.

The trial court refused

to hear evidence as to the bank's mismanagement of the estate
believing that the order approving the final
any claims based on such evidence.

accounting barred

The court persisted in that

view even though plaintiffs argued that the bank should be held
liable as trustee for failing to object to the final account that
the bank filed in its capacity as executor.

The Minnesota Supreme

Court reversed.
On appeal, the defendant bank made the same argument
Zions puts forward.

It urged that the probate court order

approving its final account as executor conclusively established
that there was no reason for the trustee to object to that
account.

Kemske, 305 N.W. 2d at 763.

The court rejected this

argument:
This is not a collateral attack on a probate
court order. It is a claim of breach of a
trustee's duty to its beneficiaries, not breach
of an executor's duty to its legatees.

...At the hearing on the final account, the
trustee—acting for the trust beneficiaries—
owed the beneficiaries a duty to use reasonable
care and diligence in examining that accounting
and objecting thereto if reasonable and prudent
to do so.... [I]t was error not to have
permitted appellants...to introduce evidence of
the executor's performance as bearing on the
trustee's duty of care.
-16-

IcL at 762-63.
In Re First National Bank, 37 Ohio St. 2d 60, 307 N.E. 2d
23 (1974), reached a similar conclusion.

There the defendant bank

was executor of an estate and trustee of a testamentary trust
created to receive assets of the estate.
more than $5,000 in inheritance taxes.

The executor overpaid

Five years after the court

approved a final accounting, plaintiffs sued the bank in its
capacity as trustee seeking damages for the overpayment.

Plaintiffs

based their claim on the theory that the bank as trustee had
failed to pursue a claim against itself as executor to recover the
tax overpayment.

The trial court held that the plaintiffs1 claim

was barred by the order approving the bank's final accounting.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the bank as trustee
had a duty to preserve the trust assets and that a claim for
breach of that duty was not barred by discharge of the bank as
executor.
Matter of the Estate of Winston, 99 111. App. 3d 278, 425
N.E. 2d 973 (1981), is another case which is directly on point.
There, a decedent's widow acted as both administratrix of his
estate and as trustee of a trust which was to receive certain
assets under his will.

More than seven years after the court

approved the widow's final account as administratrix, one of the
beneficiaries of the trust sued, alleging that she had converted
some of the assets from her husband's estate that should have been

-17-

placed into the trust.

The court rejected the argument that the

order approving the widow's final accounting barred the suit:
As trusteef she had a duty to assure that any
assets rightfully belonging to the trust became
part of the trust.... As trustee, it was
incumbent upon her to challenge the final
account if she knew or should have known that
[certain stock she retained] constituted part of
the residue of [the estate] and thus part of the
trust. [She] cannot now assert the binding
effect of the order approving the final account
obtained...in her capacity as administratrix to
escape accountability for...breach of her
fiduciary duty as trustee in failing to
challenge the final account.
Winston, 425 N.E. 2d 980-81.

The Liska and Bullis cases cited

above reach similar conclusions in precisely the same situation.
See also Succession of Tolmasf 439 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 1983).
The only authority that contradicts these cases is both
old and poorly reasoned.

See Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal. 2d

366, 79 P.2d 1096 (1938); Annot., 116 ALR 1290 (1938).

The Carr

case is the strongest and most recent such authority.

Carr was a

suit against a bank that was both executor of an estate and
trustee of a trust that succeeded to the assets of the estate
after it was closed.

The plaintiffs brought suit after the court

had discharged the bank as executor.

They alleged that the

executor had managed the estate negligently and that the trustee
was liable for failing to pursue a claim against the executor for
that negligence. The court held that the order releasing the
defendant as executor barred the suit against it as trustee.
This holding is based on a fundamental misconception
-18-

about res judicata.

In support of its holding the Carr court

stated:
[T]he court's negative determination of the
issue of the bank's liability as executor upon
the ground of negligence and fraud, of
necessity, settles that issue when the question
of the bank's negligence and fraud as executor
is brought into question in an attempt to charge
the bank as trustee.
7 9 P.2d at 1101.
law

This statement does not accurately reflect the

concerning issue preclusion.

A court's determination of an

issue in an uncontested proceeding does not bar litigation of that
issue in a subsequent action between the same parties on a
different claim.

See Restatement (2d) of Judgments §27.

The

Carr court's failure to grasp this principle may explain why no
other court has followed Carr in the forty-seven years since it
was decided.

This court should not be the first to do so.

In sum, both analysis of res judicata and the overwhelming weight of relevant authority indicate that the October 8,
1981 order approving Zions first and final accounting as personal
representative of the Jerome B. Pepper estate does not bar
plaintiffs' claim against Zions as trustee of the Jerome B. Pepper
inter vivos trust.
reasoned.

The scant authority to the contrary is poorly

Plaintiffs should therefore be permitted to assert

their second cause of action against the trustee.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's order of partial summary judgment dated
July 5, 1985 should be reversed and this matter should be remanded
-19-

for presentation of the merits of all plaintiffs' claims.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of November, 1985.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

J. Peter Mulhern, being duly sworn, says:
That he is*employed in the office of Biele, Haslam &
Hatch, attorneys for appellants.
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of
Appellants1 Brief upon the parties to the within described action
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Respondent
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first
class, postage prepaid, on the 12th day of;November, 1985.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12th day of
November, 1985.

WOTARY P UBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:

7-fr-Eff
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ADDENDUM
Order of Partial Summary Judgment
Order Approving First and Final Account, Approving Final
Settlement and Distribution; and Ratifying and Approving Acts
Including Sale of Interest in Business.
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I FILMED |'-;

]
CALLISTER & NEBEKER
GARY R. HOWE (A1552)
CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283)
JEFFREY L. SHIELDS (A2947)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 531-7676

/

&C?M,h.

Attorneys for Defendant
Zions First National Bank
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

PHILIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona
resident, et al.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
(Honorable James S. Sawaya)
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N.A. et al. ,
Civil No. C-82-2779
Defendant

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N.A. ,
Third Party Defendant,
vs
STUART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident, et al.,
Third Party Defendant,
* * * * * * *

The motion of Zions First National Bank ("Zions") for
Partial Judgment on the Pleadings or in the alternative, for
Partial Summary Judgment came before the Court, the Honorable
James S. Sawaya presiding, on the 6th day of May, 1985 at 2:00
p.m.

Charles M. Bennett, Gary R. Howe and Jeffrey L. Shields,

of and for Callister & Nebeker, appeared on behalf of
defendant, Zions First National Bank.

Edward S. Sweeney and J.

Peter Mulhern, of and for Biele, Haslam & Hatch, appeared on
behalf of the plaintiffs, Phillip C. Pepper, guardian and
conservator of Fannie N. Pepper, Phillip C. Pepper and Frances
T. Morgan.

H. Michael Keller, of and for VanCott, Bagley,

Cornwall & McCarthy, appeared on behalf of third party
defendants, Charles H. Foote and Fox & Co.

Bernard L. Rose

appeared on behalf of third party defendant, Fred M. Rosenthal.

The Court heard the argument of Mr. Bennett in favor of the
motion and the argument of Mr. Mulhern and Mr. Sweeney in
opposition to the motion.

No other parties argued the motion.

The Court also considered the memoranda of counsel on the
motion.

Thus, having been fully advised in the premises, the

Court entered its minute entry of May 6th, 1985 granting Zions'
motion.
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Thereafter, Zions submitted a proposed order pursuant to
Rule 2.9 and plaintiffs filed their objection to the scope of
the proposed order.

Memoranda was submitted by plaintiffs and

Zions in support of their respective positions.

A hearing was

held on June 10, 1985 at 2:00 p.m. and the Court heard the
argument of counsel.

Thus, having been fully advised in the

matter, the Court finds and rules as follows:

1.

The plaintiffs have expressly chosen not to seek to

set aside or vacate the order of the Honorable G. Hal Taylor,
in Probate No. 62746, the Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, dated
October 8, 1981 (the "October 8, 1981 Order").

2.

Accordingly, the October 8, 1981 Order remains res

judicata as to all of plaintiffs' claims against Zions First
National Bank which fall within the purview of the October 8,
1981 Order.

3.

All of the plaintiffs' claims in their first cause of

action (paragraphs 50 through 69 of the plaintiffs1 Second
Amended Complaint, dated December 7, 1982) fall within the
purview of the October 8, 1981 Order and should be dismissed.
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4.

All of the plaintiffs' claims in their second cause of

action (paragraphs 70 through 86) fall within the purview of
the October 8, 1981 Order and should be dismissed.

5.

Paragraphs 106 through 108 of the plaintiffs' fifth

cause of action fall within the purview of the October 8, 1981
Order and should be dismissed.

6.

Since there is not just reason for further delay and

since this Order constitutes a final order as to plaintiffs'
first and second causes of action (and related parts of
plaintiffs' fifth cause of action) it is proper for this Order
to issue pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b).

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered:

1.

All of plaintiffs' claims which fall within the

purview of the October 8, 1981 Order are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.

Those claims are encompassed in paragraphs 50

through 69. 70 through 86, 106 through 108 of the plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint, dated December 7. 1982.
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2.

This Order shall constitute a final order pursuant to

U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) .

ED: f#va*/
DATED:/

? . 1985.

By The Court:

TJirB Honorable James S.Sawaya

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINOLEY

CN2289B

Cterk
Q^W_/\ ,' » r lf 7 — ^

/

^ * »

A

^ j
Deputy Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage
fully prepaid this 18th day of June, 1985, to the following:

John S. Chindlund, Esq.
James A. Boevers, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
424 East Fifth South, Third Floor
Salt lake City, Utah 84111
Leslie L. Miller, Esq.
10 Luhr Arcade
11 West Jefferson
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Donald C. Hughes, Jr., Esq.
HUGHES & JOHNS
2411 Kiesel Avenue, Suite 101
Ogden, Utah 84401
Bernard L. Rose, Esq.
32 Exchange Place, Suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Leonard J. Lewis, Esq.
H. Michael Keller, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
Edward S. Sweeney, Esq.
J. Peter Mulhern, Esq.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

2JL
>AJ^y^^Ay?s<sr^s\
J
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EXHIBIT "C"

l ARRVLI HALL of
im
Q\ INNEY ^ \CBEKER
r
ttc ncn:
DI b t o t o of J e r o m e
400 D e s p r e t B n l d i n g
> a l t L3ke C i t y
Utah
8*111
lelephonn
532-1500
I

B

F'ppp*-,

Deceased

r n c i n l R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LM<1 COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

In the iat'er of thp Estate of
JCRO F 0

ORDER APPROVING FIRST AND
FINAL ACCOUNT, APPROVING
TINAL SETTLEMENT >\ND
DISTRIBUTION
AND RATIEYING AND APP>-0/ING
ACTS INCLUDING SALE OF
INTERIST IN BUSINESS.

PEPPER,
Deceased

Probate No. 62746

The petition of Zions First National Bank for approval of
rust

and r m a 1

Account

for final settlement and distribution

atification and approval of acts including
business

coming on regularly

saJe of interest in

to be heard, it appearing

Cour4" that du<= and legal notice has be^n given

to all

parties a^ required by law, and no person appearing
tnerelo, the Court
1
o

^idon

rpisoml

.as duly appointed

7 [ rps^ntativ*3 of

i°cpd^nt
L led
OJIO

~m

State of Utah
and

and

18, 1976, a

thereafter

is now the qualified

and

actma

the estate of said decedent

Pelition^r, as the personal representative of the
h s collated

m e U o ^

and managed

herein

the assrts of the ostat^

has published

notice to creditors

has
has

ill la ful claims of the decedent's cieditors against thr»

^G'aie o^c^Dt for two c l a n s
has ^l^clcd
)e o <~J b>
( ^[

interested

finds

of Salt Take County

2

Lo the

in opposition

The above named decedent died on Januaiy

^-»tit oier

for

as explained

in paragrapn

3 below

*o pay a portion the federal estate tax determined
tie estate

in the amount of $283 891 AO in

hich $91 6S8 00 remains unoaid)

lo

installments

has obtained consent ^C thn

State Tax Commjssion to pay a portion of the Utah Inheritance Tax
of $157,830.00 in installments over a five-year period (of which
$46,698.00 remains unpaid); and has performed all acts required of
a Personal Representative by the laws of this state pertaining to
estates of decedents.
3.

The time for presenting claims which arose prior to

the death of the decedent has expired, all claims except for a
pledge to Congregation Kol Ami, (which petitioner has arranged to
pay in installments) and a claim of Peppers Allied Metals Company
which will be settled in the course of liquidation of the latter
coiporation, have been paid; and there are no contingent, unliquidated or future claims against the estate.

There is no necessity

to further delay distribution of the estate until the remaining
claims, Utah inheritance tax and Federal Estate Tax have been paid
in full.

The assets remaining in the estate are not sufficient to

pay said remaining obligations in any event.

The petitioner, in

its capacity as Trustee under a trust agreement entered into with
the decedent, Jerome B. Pepper, on April 15, 1975 (during his
lifetime), is the sole devisee and beneficiary of all of the
rest, residue and remainder of the estate properties.

The

remaining death tax and pledge installment obligations should be
paid by Petitioner out of trusts created under said agreement.
Petitioner, as such Trustee, therefore, hereby assumes said
obligations of the estate.

The $427,036.34 open account balance

owed to Peppers Allied Metals Company (a corporation controlled by
the estate, which is presently in liquidation) is partially offset
by a payable from said corporation to the trust as set forth in
paragraph 8 below.
4.

Petitioner has filed its first and final accounting

of its administration of this estate.

Said accounting, consisting

of a summary and schedules 1 through 11C, is attached to the
petition as Exhibit A and by reference made a part hereof.

A<r shown

18th day

of May

'

on schedules 7A and 8 of said accounting, on

1981

' petitioner, in its capacity as Personal

sentative, distributed to itself, in its capacity as Trustee
nder said agreement dated April 15, 1975 the decedent's interest
aS

a co-venturer in the Learner-Pepper Company.
6.

On the 28th day of May, 1981, Petitioner, in its

capacity as such Trustee, entered into an agreement, as Seller,
with Hugo Neu Steel Products, Inc., a Massachusetts Corporation,
as Buyer, for sale to the Buyer of decedent's interest in the
Learner-Pepper Company for $1,000,000.

The sale price is subject

to adjustment to reflect additional facts, if any, disclosed by an
audit of the books of Learner-Pepper Company pursuant to the Joint
Venture Purchase Agreement executed by the parties to said sale, a
copy of which is attached to the petition as Exhibit B and by
reference made a part thereof.

All adult beneficiaries of said

trust consented in writing to said sale.

Copies of their consents

are attached to the petition as Exhibits C-l through C-5 inclusive
and are by reference made a part thereof.
7.

On the 22nd day of April, 1981, Petitioner, in its

capacity as Personal Representative, on behalf of the Estate as
controlling shareholder of Peppers Allied Metals Company, a Utah
Corporation, together with the other shareholders, caused said
company to adopt a plan of liquidation, a copy of which is
attached to the petition as Exhibit D and by reference made a part
thereof.

in accordance with said plan of liquidation and under

Petitioner's direction, the officers of Pepper Allied Metals
Company, on May 28, 1981, caused that company, as Seller, to sell
to Hugo Neu Steel Products, Inc., as Buyer, all of the fixed
assets of its Ogden, Utah, scrap metals recycling operation for
$88,352.00, pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement, a copy of
which is attached to the petition as Exhibit E and by reference
made a part thereof.
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8.

In connection with the sale transactions described in

F>«Jr ag caphs 6 and 7 above, Petitioner, in its capacity as Trustee,
u

'-°d a portion oC the proceeds of the sale of the Learner-Pepper

Company Joint Venture interest to purchase, from the Utah Copper
division, Kennecott Metals Company, a debt of Peppers Allied
Mctols Company in the amount of $225,019.36, and from Teledyne
Notional, a debt of Peppers Allied Metals Company in the amount of
S?4,356.22.

Purchase of these obligations was required by Hugo

Ncu Steel Products, Inc., the Buyer, as a condition to closing the
sales transactions.

Copies of two checks drawn by Petitioner on

raid Trust account to the respective Assignors of said debts are
attached to the petition as Exhibit "F" which is by reference made
a part thereof.
9.

Petitioner's accounting should be approved, and

all of petitioner's acts in the administration of the estate,
including those described in paragraphs 5 and 7 above, should be
ratified and approved.
10.

Those acts of petitioner performed, in its capacity

as Trustee in its administration of said Trust, which are
described in paragraphs 6 and 8 above should be ratified and
approved.

THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
a.

The final account of petitioner which is
attached to the petition, together with all
acts of petitioner in the administration of the
estate be and are hereby approved and ratified;^
petitioner be and is hereby authorized and
directed to distribute and transfer title to
the assets of the estate to petitioner as
Trustee^under said Trust Agreement dated April
15, 1975, to be held, administered and
distributed in accordance with the provisions
of said Trust Agreement, and, after petitioner
has made such final settlement and distribution
and has filed petitioner's receipts herein,
petitioner shall be discharged and the
administration of this estate closed.

b.

The acts of petitioner performed in
administering said trust which are described
herein be and are hereby ratified and approved.
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Petitioner as Trustee be and is hereby
authorized and directed to pay the remaining
pledge obligation, the Federal Estate Tax and
Utah Inheritance Tax obligations and any
remaining balance of the Peppers Allied Metals
Comp"aTT7 open account not otherwise disposed of
in the course of liquidation of that corporation out of the Trusts created under said Trust
Agreement dated April 15, 1975.
DATED

this

f

day of

S&/JS/<_

,

1981.

THE COURT

^2ik

ATTEST

District

W STERLING EVANS
Clerk

a
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QU1NNEY V NEttFKER
400 Dexirt Building

Judge

